We are obviously disappointed that a majority of our fellow TBS shareholders did not support our proposal.
We believe the facts clearly show that TBS’ excessive strategic shareholdings: (1) impair TBS’ corporate value, as reflected in the ¥200 billion gap between TBS’ asset value and market value; (2) have nothing to do with TBS’ core broadcasting business; (3) reduce the accountability and discipline of TBS management; and (4) conflict with the principles of the Corporate Governance Code.
We are particularly disappointed that we did not receive more support from institutional shareholders in light of the fact that our proposal was strongly endorsed by ISS and that TBS management has persistently failed to achieve minimal ROE targets endorsed by the Stewardship Code.
At the same time, we are encouraged that TBS management has acknowledged that its policies on strategic holdings need to be reconsidered in light of recent changes in the Corporate Governance Code. TBS management cannot ignore the fact that a number of TBS shareholders indicated their dissatisfaction with TBS management, as they have in years past, by voting against re-election of the directors nominated by the company.
In the coming months we intend to engage directly with TBS management and our fellow shareholders on ways to improve TBS’ corporate value, capital efficiency and corporate governance. We look forward to an honest dialogue that will identify constructive measures on which broad agreement can be achieved.
Despite the results of this year’s annual meeting, we believe our efforts have received positive support and attention in Japan, and that we have begun a process that will achieve positive benefits for TBS shareholders in the long run.
We will keep this website active for informational purposes and to continue dialogue will all stakeholders.
July 5, 2018